The Longbow Papers

A Touch of Gray

Imagine what conservatives would be saying if John Kerry did the things President Bush has done this year in Falluja and Najaf.

Here's a little refresher. On March 31, four American contractors are murdered in Falluja, their mutilated bodies dragged through the streets. American officials pledge to retake the city and bring the killers to justice. On April 5, 1,200 Marines encircle Falluja--digging trenches and blockading roads. After two weeks of sporadic fighting in which 36 Americans are killed, the United States halts the siege--on the condition that the militants hand over their heavy weapons. When they don't, the United States extends the cease-fire, despite insurgent attacks. Finally, on April 27, the Marines prepare for an all-out assault. U.S. planes drop flyers reading, "If you are a terrorist, beware, because your last day was yesterday." Lieutenant Karl Banke, a platoon leader with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, tells The Washington Post, "Every one of them [in his platoon] has a hunger deep down inside to finish the job. We've now shed our blood in the city. The last thing we want to do is walk away."

On April 29, the United States walks away. Taking senior military officials by surprise, the White House orders the Marines to pull back from the city, which will be patrolled by the Falluja Brigade, a roughly 1,000-man force composed of Saddam Hussein's former soldiers. The force is supposed to disarm the militants. In early June, the Post's Daniel Williams slips into Falluja and reports that, while the "brigade stays outside of town in tents, [and] police cower in their patrol cars," masked militants "[pull] cars over at will." The insurgents impose sharia on the city, banning the shaving of beards and parading alcohol venders naked through the streets. Terrorists flock to Falluja--using it as a base from which to launch kidnappings and attacks. Asked on June 17 about conditions in the city, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz tells the Post, "We're making progress."

Meanwhile, on April 4, one day before Marines encircle Falluja, Najaf-based cleric Moqtada Al Sadr incites thousands of his followers to attack police stations and government offices throughout Iraq. Coalition Provisional Authority head Paul Bremer says, "A group of people in Najaf have crossed the line. This will not be tolerated." Over the following two months, roughly 40 American soldiers die as coalition forces sporadically battle Sadr's men. Sadr's representative in Basra offers cash rewards for the killing or capture of coalition troops and says captured female troops should be kept as slaves. Finally, in late May, the United States and Sadr agree to a cease-fire. The United States drops its demand that Sadr's militiamen disarm--asking only that they avoid openly brandishing their weapons. The United States withdraws to the outskirts of Najaf and suspends efforts to bring Sadr to court for the alleged murder of a moderate Shia cleric. Polls show that Sadr, having successfully defied the United States, is now among the most popular leaders in Iraq.

On August 5, four days after Iraqi police arrest a close Sadr ally, Sadr launches another uprising. On August 8, Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi flies into Najaf aboard a U.S. helicopter to declare that there will be "no negotiations or truce." Within two days, American and Iraqi forces have surrounded Najaf's Imam Ali Shrine, where Sadr and his men have taken refuge. On August 14, Allawi reverses himself and orders a truce to allow time for negotiations. American commanders warn journalists that the delay is allowing Sadr's forces to reinforce their positions and bring in weapons (including from militants in Falluja, who are sending supplies). Lieutenant Colonel John Mayer, commander of ground troops for the 1st Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, tells the Los Angeles Times, "I hate to see us negotiate now. ... Did he uphold his word last time?" After less than a day, negotiations break off and Iraqi government officials again say "military clearing operations" are imminent--only to reverse themselves in response to protests by Iraqi delegates at a national conference. As The New Republic went to press, Sadr had snubbed a group of those delegates who had traveled to Najaf to see him, then reportedly agreed to their cease-fire proposal, although fighting continued.

If John Kerry, or Bill Clinton, had done all this, conservatives would be apoplectic. Falluja and Najaf would be exhibits A and B in their case that Democrats lack the toughness, and moral fiber, to protect America. But, since it has taken place on Bush's watch, the conservative press has been strangely muted. A number of articles in publications like National Review Online have, in recent months, criticized the Falluja deal. But few of them mention the name Bush. In the case of Najaf, repeated U.S. and Iraqi decisions to back down rather than storm the Imam Ali Shrine have elicited even less attention on the right. Perhaps conservatives have been too busy taking Kerry to task for proposing a more "sensitive" war on terrorism.

And that, ultimately, is what this is all about. By ignoring the Bush administration's repeated capitulations in the face of Islamist terrorism in Iraq, conservatives can preserve their cherished partisan categories: Kerry lacks spine; Bush doesn't blink in the face of evil. The truth is more complicated and more depressing. Having said it invaded Iraq to bring democracy, the Bush administration must now heed Iraqi public opinion. And, having said Iraq is once again sovereign, it must defer to Allawi's interim government. But, because Islamists like Sadr are vastly more popular than the United States (and more popular than Allawi, too), Bush's core principles are slamming into one another. A hard line against Islamist killers requires that we storm the Imam Ali Shrine. A commitment to democracy requires that we don't.

This is what happens when you lose the hearts and minds of a people. Because the Bush administration arrogantly refused to do what was necessary to secure--and thus rebuild--postwar Iraq, most Iraqis have turned against us. And now, America's political weakness has produced military weakness. At the end of the day, if you don't listen and you don't plan and you don't adapt, you lose your capacity to be tough. Perhaps that's what John Kerry has been trying to say.